Introduction
At the dawn of sovereign lending, the relationship between princes and their bankers was crucial. Edward III's failure to repay his debts bankrupted the Florentine families of the Peruzzi and the Bardi. The Medici Bank's many woes in the late fifteenth century were precipitated by ill-fated loans to the Lancastrian side in the Wars of the Roses.
1 Charles V famously bribed the electors of the Holy Roman Empire with a loan from Jacob Fugger the Rich, who also refused to cash the bills of exchange supplied by Charles' main contender.
2
A large literature has focused on the effects of sovereign defaults on the prominent international bankers who risked their wealth (and sometimes their lives) on a monarch's whim or good fortune. 3 Most of this literature is written as if loans were extended directly by wealthy financiers, writing large cheques to sovereigns at their discretion. In actual fact, bankers would seldom offer a loan using only their own capital.
Rather, much as modern banks do, they would tap a variety of financing sources, including demand deposits and the sale of shares in the sovereign lending ventures. These arrangements enabled them to supply much larger loans than their own resources could allow, while at the same time limiting their exposure and spreading the risk among their customers and equity partners.
In this paper, we reconstruct the chain of financing of two large sovereign loans to Philip II of Spain. Using archival documents from both the king's treasury and from 1 See De Roover (1966) , still the classic account on the Medici Bank.
2 Parker (1999, 121) .
Genoese banking families, we document the terms that international bankers negotiated with the king in Madrid, and then trace some of the ultimate risk-bearers to a partnership of merchants back in Genoa. Since the two loans were caught in Philip's fourth bankruptcy in 1596, we are also able to explore how the losses were apportioned, and what the impact of the default on the balance sheets of each participants was. The
Genoese system for financing and arranging short-term loans effectively spread the risk from lending to capricious monarchs. Complete ruin as a result of a sovereign debt crisis was unlikely as a result of diversification of risk at the level of the final investors. This would even have been true in scenarios that are worse than the ones that actually transpired.
In previous work, we examined international loans to Philip II. We obtained each of the 435 short-term debt contracts signed between the king and his bankers from 1566 to 1598 from the Archive of Simancas. We then constructed a database capturing every single clause in the contracts, and reconstructed the agreed cash flows. Based on these data, we concluded that Castile's fiscal position was sustainable throughout Philip's reign, and that the defaults that fell within our period of analysis were temporary liquidity crises (Drelichman and Voth 2010) . We also explored the incentives that governed the relationship between the king and his lenders, finding that repayment was enforced through a network of lenders. This network -a private-order institution, in the parlance of Greif (2006) -wielded considerable market power. In good times, the king serviced his loans; after each default, he came back to the negotiating table as soon as his fiscal position allowed (Drelichman and Voth 2011a) . Lending to the king was profitable -the average short-dated loan generated returns that were higher than the opportunity cost of funds (Drelichman and Voth 2011b) . Much of the lending was accompanied by contingent clauses. These allowed the king and the bankers to effectively share the risk of adverse fiscal events (Drelichman and Voth 2011c) .
In this paper, we move from the profitability of individual loans brokered by international bankers to the profitability of lending to the king of Spain for the final investor. We investigate the chain of financial intermediation that linked the king to investors small and large throughout Europe, who ultimately bore the risks. To do so, we rely on two account books from Genoese merchant families preserved in the Doria
Archive of Genoa. 4 They document the purchase of participations in two large loans to Philip II, and the subsequent performance of these investments during the 1596 default.
For the individuals in question, these loans constituted a small part of highly diversified portfolios. In consequence, the bankruptcies had only a minimal impact on the overall performance of the partnerships. International bankers were successful in effectively spreading the large risks of lending to the Spanish crown. Multiple layers of financial intermediation parceled out the many loans that underwrote Spanish power, and a large number of investors benefitted from the high returns available from lending.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a short historical primer on Castilian debt instruments and on debt crises. Section 3 gives a detailed description of two loan contracts between the king and international bankers. Section 4 shows how the bankers then spread their risk, selling shares in the loans to downstream investors in Genoa.
Section 5 analyzes the impact of the 1596 default on all the parties involved, and section 6 concludes.
Historical background

Castilian debt instruments
Philip II relied mostly on two types of debt instruments: long-term bonds backed by stable sources of revenue (juros) and short-term unsecured bank loans (asientos). Juros were either perpetual or lifetime bonds. Their issuance was subject to a limit set by the Cortes, the representative assembly of the city of Castile, which designated the revenue streams that could be used as their collateral. This limit was kept well below the fiscal capacity of the state, which made juros very safe investments. Their interest rates exhibited a slow secular decline throughout the sixteenth century; during the reign of Philip II, most juros yielded between 5% and 7.14%. The bonds were transferrable with permission from the Crown, which charged a fee to do so.
5
Juros were the cheapest source of funds for the Crown, and at any given time they constituted between 75% and 90% of total royal debt. 6 They nonetheless suffered from some important drawbacks. Finding investors with sufficiently deep pockets and long horizons on short notice could be problematic, as the Crown did not have a financial network of its own. As the sixteenth century progressed, the domestic capital market became more and more saturated with the bonds, forcing the king to place them abroad through intermediaries. More importantly, once the debt ceiling was reached, the king had to seek permission from the Cortes to increase it. This inevitably led to protracted negotiations and costly concessions. Finally, highly volatile revenues such as the remittances of American treasure could not be used to back perpetual bonds. were statistically indistinguishable from those prevailing before the suspensions (Drelichman and Voth 2011c) .
The 1575 bankruptcy is perhaps the most studied event in Castilian financial history. 12 It affected nearly two years' worth of revenue, and put the Genoese lending system to a stringent test. In some accounts, the default is even held directly responsible for Castile's military setbacks in the Netherlands. 13 The pressing need to find short-term resources triggered a feverish round of political bargaining between the king and the Cortes, which concluded with the first major tax increase of Philip's reign. 14 In the end, the large military expenditures that helped trigger the default waned as Castile reduced the intensity of its warfare, while silver remittances returned to their previous volume.
The reversal of the liquidity shocks, together with the capital reductions and the tax increases, provided the king with ample fiscal breathing room that would last for almost a decade.
The payment stop of 1596 was much less dramatic. According to Castillo (1972) , the suspension decree was hastily promulgated in the mistaken belief that the Crown would have to make disbursements in excess of 14 million ducats in the very near term.
15
The date of the suspension, November 29 1596, was just days before payments for over two million ducats came due. As was common practice, royal accountants conducted a full audit of outstanding debts after the decree; to their surprise, they found that the 12 See, among many others, Lovett (1980 Lovett ( , 1982 , De Carlos Morales (2008) , and the online appendix to Drelichman and Voth (2010) .
13 Conklin (1998) argues that the bankers' refusal to transfer funds to Flanders was a punishment mechanism that resulted in the mutiny of Spanish troops and the subsequent sack of Antwerp. In Drelichman and Voth (2011a) we present detailed historical and archival evidence contradicting this view.
14 For a detailed description of the negotiations and outcome of the Cortes of 1576, see Jago (1985) . 15 Sanz Ayán (2004) also echoes this view.
estimates were overblown by a factor of two, and that outstanding asientos were slightly over 7 million ducats. 16 This represented about two thirds of annual revenue, an easily manageable sum for the royal treasury, especially after the arrival of the very rich fleet of 1596. As a result, the Cortes were not asked for further tax increases, and a settlement was reached in short order. Most of the capital was repaid in good quality juros, with the only haircut resulting from an interest rate reduction in a portion of the outstanding bonds. Bankers accepted a capital loss of 20%, and lending resumed once again. 
Two asientos from 1596
In this section we turn our attention to two contracts jointly underwritten by Agustín Spinola and Nicolás De Negro in February and July of 1596. 18 Spinola and De Negro were members of two prominent Genoese banking families. The Spinola were the largest lenders to Philip II, supplying over 16 million ducats between 1566 and 1600. They accounted for over 20% of total short-term borrowing over the period. 19 While the scale of lending by the De Negro was more modest, amounting to some 770,000 ducats in total, they were also among the leading business families in Genoa. 20 Agustín and Nicolás -to whom, in accordance with the loan documents, we refer by their Spanish names -lived permanently in Madrid, and were in charge of managing the financial operations their families entered into with the king. This included negotiating new loans, arranging the disbursements promised in Madrid, and issuing the necessary letters of exchange to authorize disbursements abroad. They were also responsible for collecting the repayments, which required skill at navigating the royal bureaucracy and trustworthy agents in the many places were treasurers in charge of different royal revenue streams were stationed. Finally, the bankers had to obtain the necessary permits to remit the proceeds back to their families in Italy or wherever else they were needed, and had to ensure that the bullion was delivered to a port of exit and shipped safely. agreed to lend over one million ducats, but only disbursed 127,000 before the payment stop of 1596 put a premature end to the contract. We use the latter amount in our calculations. The complete methodology used in obtaining these figures is discussed in Drelichman and Voth (2011b) .
The king promised to repay the capital using the proceeds of the tres gracias from the years 1597 and 1598, as well as those from the ordinary and extraordinary servicios.
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The contract stipulated that the proceeds of these taxes would be disbursed to bankers in six installments, starting in July of 1598, and every four months thereafter. The interest rate would be one percent per month, not compounding; each capital repayment would also be accompanied by the accrued interest on that part of the capital only. The first installment would also include an extra two months of interest. As additional compensation, the bankers were allowed to swap juros worth up to 485 ducats for other bonds of their choice. This allowed them to purchase non-performing bonds at bargain
prices in the open market, exchange them at the treasury for choice securities, and net a profit that could not have been much less than the face value of the juros.
23
The contract also included a number of additional provisions. First, the bankers were allowed to export bullion for the entire amount of the principal. Although 112,500 ducats were to be delivered in Castile, the bankers would be raising the necessary funds outside the kingdom, and would hence need to export the repayments to satisfy their own liabilities. The bankers were also given permission to export an additional 60,000 ducats to Portugal. These export licenses were valuable, as they allowed their holders to arbitrage between different currency markets. Bankers could sell them to other businessmen. If a license went unused, the treasury would on occasion buy it back.
Spinola and De Negro were also given the option of collecting their repayments from alternative income streams. In particular, they were allowed to choose to be repaid from the fleets of 1596 and 1597. This would likely have allowed them to start collecting a few months earlier, at the cost of forfeiting the extra 2% on the first installment.
Alternatively, the bankers could request that repayment be made in the form of lifetime juros. This would have allowed them to receive payment almost immediately, but at a higher cost. 24 The contract also allowed bankers to opt for perpetual juros, but they would have to wait until the originally promised repayment dates to collect them. This last option would only be valuable if, for some reason, the original income streams from where the repayments were promised failed to perform. Finally, the contract allowed the bankers the use of one or two royal galleys to convey the necessary bullion to Italy. Table 1 shows the agreed cash flows from the asiento of February 24. All the disbursements occur in the first six months of the contract and, with the exception of the small profit from the juro operation, no repayments are promised until July of 1598, a full 30 months after the beginning of the contract. In laying out the cash flows, we abstract from the several options that the bankers could exercise, such as choosing different repayment streams or convert part of their credits into juros. Most of these would have resulted in some small variation to the profitability of the contract. The actual sign and magnitude of the change depended on the conditions of the debt and money markets at the time, which are unobservable to us. In order to produce a conservative estimate of rate of return, we also omit the profit from the license to export bullion to Portugal.
25 24 For accounting purposes, juros were valued as perpetual streams. Lifetime bonds, however, stopped performing at the death of their holders, and hence had a lower present value than perpetuities. 25 This would have likely yielded between one and two percent of the 60,000 ducats under license, and hence perhaps enhanced the overall profitability of the contract in the order of 0.2% to 0.4% per year, Had the contract been honored as originally signed, the bankers would have realized a yearly rate of return of 10.4%. 26 If they chose to exercise some of the built-in options -for example, requesting payment from the fleets while forfeiting the extra months of interest -the returns could have climbed to 11.7% per year. The bankruptcy decree of November 1596 came once the bankers had disbursed the entire principal, but
had not yet received a single repayment. In terms of timing, this is the worst scenario that depending on the timing and actual yield of the transaction. Since the actual return would have depended on the relative conditions of the Spanish and Portuguese money markets, which we do not observe, we refrain from including this additional profit in our calculations.
a banker could find himself in. The settlement of 1597 gave the bankers juros worth 80% of the outstanding debt. The promised returns evaporated. Evaluated at its terminal date of March 1600, considering the capital loss and adding the yield of the juros, the operation netted a loss of 1.08% per year.
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The second asiento was signed on July 26, 1596. This was a much larger contract.
Spinola and De Negro agreed to deliver one million ecús of 57 plaques in Flanders in 14
payments. The first 13 payments were to amount to 65,000 ecús each, and the fourteenth would have consisted of the remaining 155,000 ecús. The disbursements were to start on September 1 1596, and continue at a monthly frequency. For accounting purposes, the Flemish ecús were being valued at 1.088 ducats each, although their theoretical gold content only amounted to 0.977 ducats. The contract thus provided for a potential profit of 10.5% in the exchange operation alone, although the actual profit would have depended on the market value of the Flemish ecús.
The king agreed to repay a total of 1,088,267 ducats of principal, which represented 1,000,245 ecús at the agreed conversion rate. 28 As with the February contract, interest would be added to each installment at the time of repayment. Because of the size of the loan, the king had to tap several revenue sources to repay it. Thus, he promised the bankers:
1) 75,133 ducats from the royal direct and indirect taxes corresponding to the year 1595, and payable by the end of 1596. 27 Because the MIRR incorporates the opportunity cost of funds, its value depends on the terminal date of the contract. We use the terminal date originally specified in the contract to calculate the losses sustained in the restructurings. The reason is that the bankers expected to have their funds tied up until that time, and would have made their original investment decisions based on that terminal date. This also ensures comparability between the expected and actual rates of return.
2) 75,133 ducats in the taxes owed by the city of Seville, and charged on the goods brought by the fleet, also payable by the end of 1596.
3) 75,000 ducats from the proceeds of the goods of Cardinal Don Gaspar de Quiroga. The yearly interest rate applied to each payment was to be 12% (simple, not compounding), calculated from July 1596. Payments from the tres gracias received an extra month of interest, while payments from the servicios received an extra two months of interests, and an additional two months for not otherwise specified "costs". The bankers were given broad authority to collect their payments from alternative revenue streams; however, they could only convert up to 100,000 ducats of repayments into juros, and another 100,000 ducats from the 1596 payments into silver from the Indies. The king also provided fortified galleys for the transportation of the bullion. 3) A loan of some 215,000 ducats in September-October 1597.
It is not possible to separate the compensation for each of the three components, as they are not identified in the contract itself. The profit is nonetheless all backloaded, as the bankers swing decisively into surplus with the last six repayments. The options built into the contract only allowed the bankers to switch the source of the repayments; since they did not affect their timing or amount, this would not have affected the rate of return.
Had the contract been honored as agreed, the annualized rate of return would have been
17.6%.
This contract mirrored a number of other loans, which called for large repayments in the months of November and December 1596. Indeed, it is quite likely that the time of the payment stop was dictated by this fact.
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. As the next section illustrates, the bankers managed to collect part of the first payment prior to the November 1596 suspension, and recovered 80% of the remaining amount in 1597. When evaluated at the terminal date of March 1599, the operation resulted in an annualized loss of 4.82%.
Parceling out the risk
Families like the Spinola regularly entered into asientos worth hundreds of thousands of ducats. Even if they had had the financial wherewithal to remain liquid whenever the king declared a payment stop, lending such enormous amounts to a single borrower may not have been a good business strategy. In Drelichman and Voth (2011b), we calculate the excess return from asiento lending. After losses from the bankruptcies and after the opportunity cost of funds, it amounted to 3.16%. While such a return compared favorably to other available financial instruments, and even to some commercial ventures, it came with the considerable risk of extended periods during which loans were not serviced. The solution adopted by international bankers was to sell shares in their asiento ventures in exchange for a fee. This allowed them to spread the risk involved among other investors while fine-tuning their own exposure. Parceling out the risk was so central to the asiento system that most large contracts allowed bankers a few months of lead time before the main disbursement. This allowed them to tap the European payment fairs for the needed funds. 32 In some cases, the king even advanced "working capital" to the bankers, providing them with a sum of money that could be used to round up prospective investors.
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While the original contracts preserved at the Archive of Simancas only identify the main underwriters, it is possible to find shares of Spanish asientos in the account books of merchant families based in Genoa. One such book is the libro mastro of a society formed by the brothers Lazzaro and Benedetto Pichenotti, and Gio Girolamo Di Negro, preserved in the Archivio Doria at the University of Genoa. 34 The Pichenotti belonged to a wellknown merchant family, which nonetheless never lent directly to the king of Spain. Gio
Girolamo Di Negro was a member of the De Negro family that participated in the asientos, although his name is never found in the contracts themselves.
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The Pichenotti -Di Negro society purchased shares in both the asientos described in the previous section. They contributed 5,265 ducats and 4,500 ecús to the one concluded on February 24, and 30,000 ecús to the one signed on July 26. Half of the capital was supplied by the Pichenotti brothers, and the other half by Di Negro. The society would make the disbursements and collect repayments under the same conditions that the Spanish bankers had stipulated with the king. The intermediation fee payable to the Spanish bankers was 1%. 34 Archivio Doria; Inventario Doria 193. This book was first identified by Felloni (1978) . Our description closely follows his account.
35 When referring to bankers based in Genoa, we use the Italian spelling of their names. 36 The asientos at Simancas only allow us to observe the promised cash flows, not the actual ones. The Pichenotti -Di Negro account book thus provides a rare window into what actually transpired after the contracts had been signed. This example makes it clear that deviations from the letter of the contracts did
The default froze all further cash flows on the Pichenotti -Di Negro participation.
The situation began to thaw with the settlement of November 1597, in which the bank debt was converted into juros. Two thirds of the debt was repaid in 7.14% bonds, which largely traded at par. The remaining third was repaid through a bond swap, reducing the interest rate on juros acquired or already held by the bankers, and entailing a net loss of 20% of the original capital of the outstanding asientos. The Spanish bankers collected the bonds corresponding to the settlement, calculated the share of principal and interest corresponding to the Genoese society, deducted their fees, collection and conveyance expenses, and forwarded the remainder to Genoa using the same mix of assets they had received from the king. Paying creditors in this fashion was known as the provision of la misma moneda -literally, "the same currency". Since bankers received bonds in the settlements, requiring them to pay their creditors back in cash would have created serious liquidity problems for them. The arrangement of la misma moneda allowed international lenders to forward the bonds downstream to the smaller investors that had supplied them with capital. This applied regardless of whether investors had purchased specific shares in an asiento, or just made a demand deposit with the banking house.
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The accounts of the Pichenotti -Di Negro society were finalized and closed in 1600. By that point, with no more credits outstanding, they had received a total of 38,741 ducats net of costs, in cash and bonds of different characteristics. This represented a loss not always harm the bankers -the early arrival of the fleet meant that they collected a portion of their debts earlier than expected, hence mitigating the impact of the bankruptcy. 
The impact of negative shocks on Genoese trading families
The true test of any risk-sharing system comes in bad times. The rhetoric during the bankruptcies was harsh enough. Bankers complained loudly to the king about how poorly he rewarded their loyalty. 40 Contemporary business commentators bemoaned the plight of the widows and orphans of Genoa. 41 Scholars such as Fernand Braudel assumed that 38 In the Pichenotti -Di Negro account book, the ecús are valued at the exchange rate agreed to between the king and the Madrid bankers, rather than at their metallic content. This suggests that the Madrid bankers did not pass through the profits obtained in the exchange operation.
39 To obtain conservative estimates, we assume the intermediation fee was front-loaded. 40 On December 22, 1575, Lorenzo Spinola wrote to the king, complaining that he had been enormously harmed by the suspension decree and reminding him of the many services and favors he had provided over the years. He then asks the king to make good on his promises because "the word of a king is a law" In Drelichman and Voth (2011b) , we showed that asiento lending was profitable on average over the long run, and for almost all participants. While the bankruptcies caused short-term losses on specific contracts, these were more than offset by high profits during normal times. Our result applied to the families that kept representatives in Madrid and dealt directly with the king. It is nonetheless possible that the bankruptcies had a stronger impact on those smaller financiers that supplied the international bankers with capital. We now explore this issue in more detail using a second document preserved in the Doria Archive of Genoa.
Gio Girolamo Di Negro -who partnered with the Pichenotti brothers to invest in the two ill-fated asientos described in section 3 -also kept his own master account books, as was customary. These libri mastri detailed all the assets, liabilities and profits or losses for the relevant period. The book covering the period between April 1596 and October 1598 is preserved in the Doria Archive, allowing us a window into the impact of the November 1596 default. 43 At the end of the period, in October 1598, Di Negro had not yet received the settlement payments corresponding to his participation in the asientos.
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He recorded his participation in the society with the Pichenotti brothers as an asset worth 42 Braudel alludes to the negative effects of the Spanish bankruptcies in several passages throughout La Mediterranee, writing, for example, "every time the state declared itself bankrupt, bringing contracts to a violent end, there were always some actors who lost, fell through a trap-door, or tiptoed away towards the wings." (Braudel 1966, 362-3) . 43 Archivio Doria; Inventario Doria 192. 44 This is consistent with the society's book, which records the final settlement in 1600.
7,500 Genoese lire, and he also had another 1,116 lire invested in a different asiento.
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The final balance sheet shows that Di Negro had total assets worth 96,252 Genoese lire.
He turend a profit of 6,025 lire. Since these were earned over a period of 30 months, the annual profit was 2.4%. Di Negro was not doing particularly well by the standards of the time. Investing in long-term bonds would have netted him 7% or more, with little risk (but also less of a chance to receive the principal back anytime soon, or without a discount). 46 However, his poor performance overall must have stemmed overwhelmingly from his commercial ventures, which represented over 90% of his portfolio. More importantly, he was in no danger of financial ruin as a result of Castile's default. Had
Philip II completely repudiated his debts, Di Negro would have lost less than 9% of his assets. Over the period covered in the account book, this would have translated into annualized excess losses of 3.5%. This result is consistent with our findings for the toplevel bankers, and yields a powerful insight into the strength of the overall system. While the defaults of Philip II caused substantial losses, no link in the chain of financial intermediation was exposed to catastrophic risk when they occurred.
Conclusion
When does the repackaging and reshuffling of risk work? There are many reasons today to question the benefits of securitization. As the financial crisis of 2008-10 made clear, new securities consisting of repackaged mortgages failed to provide risk diversification.
Losses in a small corner of the financial system soon threatened to overwhelm it in its entirety. We go back to the 16 th century to look at a successful example of how financial intermediation can "work", by offering a combination of attractive returns and relatively modest risk. In part, it did so by passing on some of the exposure from bankers to final investors.
Short-term lending to the Spanish Crown involved relatively large loans, underwritten by a handful of powerful financiers. The concentrated structure of lending facilitated co-ordination between bankers, and allowed them to put pressure on the Crown to settle on generous terms in times of crisis. To avoid the risk implied by a few bankers making very large loans, these were often parceled out into smaller packets, and sold on to private investors (for a fee).
We examine the performance of two such investments during Philip II's fourth and final default, in 1596. The Pichenotti -Di Negro partnership bought participations in two short-term loans to the king, underwritten by Agustín Spinola and Nicolás De Negro.
They were affected by the payment stop. We carefully reconstruct the profitability of these two investments, and interpret them in the context of the investors' portfolio overall. The original underwriters achieved a full risk transfer -they only owed the partnership the respective proportion of the money that they received from the king. We find that losses were modest overall, and that these investments did not constitute a large fraction of the partners' wealth. While a sudden payment stop was not a small matter for investors, there was no domino effect -a wave of defaults as one creditor after another sees a large share of his assets disappear or turn illiquid.
By effectively selling "shares" in loans made to the King of Spain, Genoese bankers could achieve a dual objective. They continued to monopolize access to the short-term lending market. This was necessary for lending to be sustainable (Drelichman and Voth 2011a) , and it cannot have been bad for profitability. At the same time, selling on parts of the loans reduced the principal lender's risk. In this way, securitization was remarkably successful: It provided both funds to the Spanish monarchy at the height of its powers, and the system weathered the effect of temporary, negative shocks such as the 1596 bankruptcy.
